The summer of 2023 will be remembered for the initial uprising of the Wagner Group against Putin in June, followed by the shocking death of the paramilitary leader in a recent plane crash. Amidst these events, the high-level summit in July in Saint Petersburg stands out, where Putin and African leaders solidified alliances and strategic agreements. Throughout June, July, and August, the eternal triangle between Africa, Putin, and France solidifies, leaving Ukraine on the sidelines. However, the expansion of the Wagner empire in Africa now faces uncertainties ranging from the group’s operational continuity to the future of relations between Russia, France, and African governments.
The tragic accident that claimed the lives of Prigozhin and his lieutenant Dmitry Utkin did not halt the advance of the Wagner Group, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who emphasized its leadership in paramilitary operations in Africa. However, expansion in countries like Burkina Faso and Niger faces challenges under Russian governance. The failed mutiny attempt organized by Prigozhin in June generated tensions and questioned the stability of the paramilitary group. Although operations in Mali and the Central African Republic persist due to existing contracts, uncertainty surrounds their expansion into other territories.
The balance between Wagner and African governments has been delicate. Malian leaders, for example, still refer to Russian mercenaries as “instructors,” while authorities in the Central African Republic have maintained an ambiguous stance. The new situation has left many African governments in an uncomfortable position, as their relationship with Wagner is not only with the company itself but also with Russia.
Although Prigozhin is absent, Russian influence in Africa will persist. Various Russian institutions benefit from its presence and will seek to maintain relationships. Rivalry between Wagner and the GRU (Russian military intelligence) could affect relations with Africa. Those interested in Wagner may reconsider, reassessing their relationship with Moscow. In search of security, African countries find mercenary groups an attractive alternative, as other options are scarce in this field.
Political change in Francophone nations sharpens economic shifts. Burkina Faso and Mali, which hosted French troops in the fight against terrorism, now demand the withdrawal of French soldiers. Niger’s coup leaders have given an ultimatum to the French ambassador to leave the capital this week. These countries, along with Guinea and the Central African Republic, seek Russian security without neocolonialism. This transformed alliance challenges Francophone states. Chad and Nigeria are the last French bastions in the Sahel. If they fall, Ivory Coast, Benin, Senegal, and Togo will face pressure to distance themselves from Paris. France established “Françafrique,” a neocolonial system. The French should seek humility in their path to learning the new African geopolitics.
In summary, like the beats of the Russian dance, “Kalinka,” and the frenzy of the French dance, “Cancan,” internal and external challenges, the demand for security could continue their persistent dance. Although Prigozhin has left the stage, Russian influence through the GRU continues to choreograph African geopolitics. The arrival of autumn raises the curtain with doubts about France in Niger and Mali, alongside the enigmatic “accidental death” of Prigozhin. The summer choreography fades, shaping Europe-Africa relations in a challenging autumn.
